The Economics of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Selling to Someone who Has Personal Valuation by Martin Daniel Siyaranamual
Working Paper 




Center for Economics and Development Studies,
Department of Economics, Padjadjaran University
Jalan Cimandiri no. 6, Bandung, Indonesia. 
Phone/Fax: +62-22-4204510
http://www.lp3e-unpad.org
For more titles on this series, visit:
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/unpwpaper/
The Economic of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR): 





No. 200706The Economic of Corporate Social Responsibility





This paper provides general insight on the economic feasibility and desir-
ability of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), in order to explain why some
￿rms voluntarily over comply with social matters. In this paper I de￿ne CSR
as the activity in which ￿rms makes an explicit pair between the sales of private
good and the provision of public good. Furthermore, the consumers are divided
into two di⁄erent categories; responsible consumers and non responsible ones.
The main result shows that CSR activity could be considered as a ￿rm￿ s strat-
egy to internalize the externality, and thus it would not be contradicted with
pro￿t maximization. Moreover, could be an alternative way for the provision
of public good, especially in the presence of government failure.




Recently there is a signi￿cant grow in the number of ￿rms which adopt Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR) codes, for example in the spring of 2004, Exxon, Chiquita,
McDonald￿ s, Coca-cola and Ford Motor Company all had statements of commitments
to environmental and social values ￿guring prominently on their homepages, together
with reports of costly measure taken to promote these values. And not only that, the
number of consumers who are willing to pay more for a product with CSR label is
increasing, for example MORI ￿nd that 70% of consumers are willing to pay more for
an ethical product1. And we can ￿nd also in the annual report of Fair-trade Labeling
Organizations International (FLO), the volume of fair-trade sales increase sharply,
especially in North America2.
Corporate Social Responsibility is an ill and incompletely de￿ned concept. From
one perspective it is the assumption and ful￿llment of responsibilities beyond those
dictated by markets. Wood (1991) states that the fundamental idea of CSR is that
business and society are working together in harmony as one entity rather than two
distinct entities; therefore society has certain expectations for appropriate business
behavior and outcomes. Other conceptions of CSR focus on performance and out-
comes based on pro￿t, which can be assessed independently of motivation.
To understand why ￿rms adopt practices or do something that would be labeled as
CSR, it is necessary to examine the motivation for adoption. First is moral/altruistic
motivation, this is the fundamental and the true basis for CSR activity, where ￿rms
do something purely to meet society￿ s expectations. Second, ￿rms are motivated only
by its pro￿t may adopt CSR in order to respond the future threat. Third is similar
with the second, but this time to ful￿ll the demand of responsible good. The last two
reasons are called as strategic CSR, simply because it depends on pro￿t-maximization
1http://www.mori.com/polls/2003/mori-csr.shtml
2http://www.fairtrade.net/uploads/media/FLO_Annual_Report_05.pdf
2strategy motivated by self-interest and not by a conception of CSR itself.
Nonetheless, these reasons are another way of internalizing the externalities without
sacri￿ce the pro￿t maximization objective. And thus pro￿t maximization is accept-
able, whether from the economic point of view of social point of view. Furthermore
these reasons are in line with the argument of Milton Friedman (1962) about the
classical dichotomy between the role of Private Corporation and government￿ s role,
where corporation as an arti￿cial legal structure have one objective which is to max-
imize its pro￿t and leave the social problem and provision of public good in the hand
of government.
In this recent era, where government￿ s credibility to carry-out their role is in ques-
tion, CSR could be a new way to solve the social problem or the provision of public
good, but at the same time it does not violate its main objective. Depart from this
point, this paper try to show formally that CSR activity is feasible, in the sense it does
not sacri￿ce the pro￿t, either under highly competitive market (Bertrand competition
game) or less competitive one (Cournot competition game). Not only the problem of
feasibility this paper has, but also it tries to examine the problem of desirability in
the sense CSR outcomes are compared to the government regulation.
In the model I de￿ne CSR activity as the making of an explicit pair of private good
production or sales with provision of public good or any social activity. In addition,
I use extensively a warm glow variable from the paper of James Andreoni (1989) in
my model.
Generally, the result from this paper follows the result from the previous studies
on feasibility and/or desirability of CSR activity. Nevertheless, the presence of warm
glow variable makes an important contribution to the understanding of economic
intuition behind the phenomena of SCR activity. Furthermore this paper also uses
less competitive market, to capture the question about whether the same phenomena
under high competitive market happen when we talk about less competitive market.
3As we would expect, same phenomena also happen even though we are in the less
competitive market, but it is worth to note that it is necessary to see at di⁄erent angle
for the phenomena under less competitive market, especially for the case of imperfect
monitoring and the entry cost.
There is small existing literature on CSR that build a quantitative model, to show
that the CSR codes adoption is not violating the ￿rms￿main objective to maximize
pro￿ts. And basically they are focusing, either on feasibility￿ related with pro￿t
maximization, or on desirability.
For feasibility, the most relevant paper is the paper of Mark Bagnoli and Susan
G. Watts (2003), in which they examine the feasibility of CSR activities with warm-
glow altruism variable on consumers￿utility function. Under two di⁄erent competition
games; Bertrand competition game and Cournot competition game, they ￿nd with the
competition for social responsible consumers, can lead to excessive provision of public
goods. Secondly, there is trade-o⁄ to attain the e¢ ciency between the production of
private goods and provision of pubic goods, in particular when the environment is
less competitive (Cournot competition game). Still on the same side, is the paper of
Seema Arora and Shubhashis Gangopadhyay (1995), in which they build a model to
rationalize two empirically observed phenomena, where ￿rms have a tendency to be
known as "green" and over comply the environmental standards. Kjell Arne Brekke
and Karine Nyborg (2005) study on the impact of CSR codes adoption to wages and
worker productivity with two crucial assumptions; workers￿behaviors are a⁄ected by
common ethical principle and the impact for each worker is di⁄erent. On the other
side, the most relevant paper that study on the issues of desirability is the paper
of David P. Baron (2001), in which he considers CSR as strategic policy of ￿rms, in
order to response the activist movement which put pressure on ￿rm to adopt stringent
environmental policy.
Up to now, the paper of Timothy Besley and Maitreesh Ghatak (2006) is the only
4paper that studies about feasibility and desirability, where ￿rms see CSR activities
is the provision of public goods that naturally linked with the sales of private goods.
And there are two groups of consumers; the caring consumers, the group that have
valuation on public goods and the neutral consumers, the one who do not have any
valuation on public goods.
They ￿nd that CSR is consistent with pro￿t maximization, and the provision of
public goods with CSR is exactly same with private provision of public goods. Nev-
ertheless, the division of consumers depends on the group valuation and not on the
personal valuation. Additionally, only caring consumers who get the bene￿t from
public goods provided, since only them who have a group valuation on public goods.
Well in some cases it is possible, for example the non sweatshop products. But if we
extend to the case for environmental friendly products, then it is no longer true that
only caring consumers who can get the bene￿t from the CSR activities or the public
good provided.
THE MODEL
The model that I present here, most of it follows the general framework of Timothy
Besley and Maitreesh Ghatak (2006) with two main di⁄erences; under two competi-
tion games (Bertrand and Cournot competition game) and the distinguish between
personal valuation and common bene￿t of public good (Bagnoli and Watts, 2003).
In this model, ￿rms sell a homogeneous private good that either paired with public
good (responsible good) as a ￿rm strategic policy or sell the non-paired with public
good (non-responsible good).
5The Consumers
There is a ￿nite number of potential consumers I, where they will be characterized,
either as a responsible consumer if they have a personal valuation of public good
VR (￿i)3 to be increasing and concave and the size for this characteristic is h where
h > 0. Or the consumers will be characterized as a non-responsible consumer if they
do not have a personal valuation of public good, and the size for this characteristic
is I ￿ h. Furthermore, the consumers￿decision, for which type of good they will
consume, depends on their own personal valuation Vi(￿i). Each consumer buys at
least one unit private good x with price p > 0, and get a bene￿t b > 0 from his/her
consumption of the private good and the public good provided f(G) and G is total
public good provided. Let the utility function for each consumer be quasi-linear:
￿ Consumer utility function:
Ui = b ￿ p + ￿






UR = b ￿ p + VR(￿i) + f(G); where f(G) is concave
￿ Non responsible consumers:
UN = b ￿ p + f(G)
The Firms
There is free entry and potential producers have an identical cost function and can
produce a unit of private good at cost c+￿￿ where ￿ ￿ 0 is the amount of public good
3Personal valuation is a warm-glow variable from the paper of Andreoni (1989)
6that one ￿rm commit to be paired with the private good (called as CSR activity).
And Z is the set of ￿rms in which each of them has the capacity to serve the entire
market and o⁄ers di⁄erent levels of public good ￿ in combination with the private
good produced for di⁄erent consumers.
In this model, the ￿rm only produce a single level of public good, instead of o⁄ering
a menu of choices. Thus, ￿ is representing the mission of the ￿rm rather than a
statement that applies to a single product (Besley and Ghatak, 2006). Nevertheless,
this distinction does not play an important role, even if somebody considers multi-
product ￿rms, since the personal valuation is already appeared in the model.
Market Equilibrium
In the market equilibrium, ￿rms will maximize the pro￿t and all consumers will
maximize their utility. For all type of competitions, ￿rms will move ￿rst by providing
a (pj;￿j) pair for Bertrand competition and (qj;￿j) for Cournot competition game,
then consumers will decide which ￿rm they will purchase the private good x weather
it paired with private good ￿ > 0 or not paired with public good ￿ = 0.
The equilibrium among consumers for ￿xed pricing or ￿xed quantity and ￿rm￿ s o⁄er
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under Cournot competition game. D￿
ij is the behavior of consumer i for i = 1;￿￿￿ ;I.
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Proposition 1. There is a unique equilibrium for each type of consumers and the
￿rms which serve them.
p
￿















Proof for Proposition 1 is in appendix section. Proposition 1 also face a free rider
problem, eventhough there is a personal valuation. Based on Samuelson rule, we
can ￿nd the optimal level of public good, in which everybody in the society make a
contribution from their purchase. Since the contribution based only on the purchase










o). Which is mean each responsible
consumer will have the same amount of bene￿t from their contribution.
Examinations for Bertrand Competition Game A clear distinction of personal
valuation and common bene￿t for the public good, rouse several importance condi-
tions, which are associated with the level of public good provided by the responsible
￿rms.
Condition 1 Raising CSR standard
Consider the situation in which ￿rms raise the standard of CSR activity, by in-
creasing their commitment to provide more of public good ￿. I de￿ne the high-





+ f0(hb ￿), and
VR (￿i) + f (h￿) ￿ f ((h ￿ 1)￿) = ￿b ￿. Note that the increase of CSR standard come
8volutarely from responsible ￿rms, and therefore if there were some means to raise ￿$
to b ￿, will creates Pareto improvement.
Moreover, the raise of standard will always below the ￿rst best level of public
good ￿o = hV 0
R (￿
o
i) + hf0 (h￿
o) since each responsible consumer has private bene￿t
from her personal contribution. And eventhough utility function from public good
does not satisfy ￿
Gf00(G)
f0(G) ￿ 1 or in other words the marginal utility diminish so fast,
high optimal level of public good still consistent with CSR. And also, the private
contribution will never goes to zero when the size of responsible consumers increases.
In addition, this result is not contradicted with the argument of William J. Baumol
(1991), who states the highest standard could not be implemented in a normal market,
because ￿rms will always undercut a little bit and o⁄er a new pair of (pj;￿j) that





+ f0(hb ￿) < ￿ =
VR(￿i)+f(h￿)￿f((h￿1)￿)
b ￿ .
Condition 2 Bertrand competition with capacity constraint
In many setting, it is natural to suppose that ￿rms operate under conditions of
eventual decreasing return to scale, at least in the short run, when capital is ￿xed.
And one of the case from decreasing return to scale is capacity constraint which
prevents the ￿rm from producing more than a given maximal amount, say e qi.
With capacity constraint, it is no longer reasonable to assume that prices announced
by the ￿rms represent a commitment to provide any demanded quantity, since the






= ￿jDjfCjg ; 0 < ￿j < 1 for responsible ￿rms.
￿ e qj = ￿jDjfCjg ; 0 < ￿j < 1 for non responsible ￿rms.
The introducing of capacity constraint a⁄ects the proposition 1 is no longer valid.
In this case, the Bertrand outcome p￿
N = c and p￿
R = c + ￿￿
￿
R are no longer equilib-
rium. To see this, note that there are some ￿rms which cannot supply all demand at
9equilibrium price, thus others will anticipate making a strictly positive level of sales
by increasing their price slightly di⁄erent from cost, pN + " > c and pR + " > c + ￿￿
as a result others have a reason to deviate too from the equilibrium price. If all
responsible ￿rms face the same level of capacity constraint and still want to attain
the equilibrium level of public good ￿, just like in the Proposition 1, then they have
to introduce an additional cost.
pR = c+￿￿R+"(￿R), where "(￿R) is an additional cost of one to one private-public
good paired form responsible ￿rms, to reach the level at Proposition 1, in which there
is no capacity constraint, with "0 > 0 and "00 ￿ 0. Then the level of public good
provided will be ￿ = V 0
R (￿i) + f0(h￿) ￿ "0 (￿i).
Proposition 2. In the presence of capacity constraint, responsible consumers have
an incentive to deviate with expensive additional cost. And it could be no one will
contribute if the additional cost exceed the bene￿t of personal valuation.
Proof for Proposition 2 in in appendix. If the value of personal valuation is re-
ally high relatively to the additional cost, then it is still possible that responsible
consumers still consume the responsible good, eventhough the amount is less than
before, and thus will a⁄ect the total amount of public good provided as well.
Condition 3 The entry cost
In this condition, we assume that ￿rms making a decisions at two stage. At the
￿rst stage the ￿rms will decide whether or not to enter, then at the second stage they
will compete in prices. From a standard Bertrand competition argument, if two or
more ￿rms enter, then price equals marginal cost in the second stage, so that pro￿t
are zero and each ￿rm makes a net loss of setup cost, ￿ at the second stage. Thus it is
clear that ￿rm i￿ s optimal decision is to enter if and only if no other ￿rms enter. This
condition shows that in the presence of setup cost the pursuit of pro￿t and the social
good are contradictory goals. Unless, the ￿rms which adopt CSR can earn some ex
10post rents for their good social reputation.
Condition 4 Monitoring
In the previous condition, we have seen where the ￿rms which adopt CSR need
to earn some ex post rents to cover the setup cost of building the social reputation.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that consumers will accept these social initiatives as sin-
cere actions and thus may or may not reward the ￿rm. Prior research con￿rm this
argument (Brown and Dacin, 1997; Creyer and Ross, 1997; Sen and Bhattacharya,
2001). Here we will see the possibility that ￿rms will cheat by deviating from the
pair of (pj;￿j) that they promised in the beginning. Following the framework of Klein
and Le› er (1981), Shapiro (1983) and Besley and Ghatak (2006), we assume that
there is an in￿nite horizon and, in each period, the ￿rm could weather being honest
by providing the promised pair of (pj;￿j) or cheat and deviate for what he promised
and set
  !
￿ = ￿￿, where
  !
￿ is the level of CSR activities which ￿rm carried out and ￿
is the cheating level of one ￿rm, with ￿ 2 f0;1g. And when ￿rm is caught cheating,
he will lose his market for responsible consumers forever, which is mean that either
he makes nothing or change to serve the non responsible consumers.
I also assume here that all ￿rms are risk neutral, and if he was cheating, will get
proved with probability ￿. When he is proved cheating, then he loses his reputation
with probability ￿. Firm￿ s payo⁄when he does not cheat is: ￿ = f(pR ￿ c ￿ ￿￿R) + rg,
where r is the rents that ￿rm can earn for his good social reputation. And ￿rm￿ s pay-
o⁄ when he cheats will be:
  !
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)fpR ￿ c + rg + ￿ fpR ￿ c + (1 ￿ ￿)rg. In
this condition, being honest is sustainable when ￿ ￿
  !
￿ . The simplest way to prove
these inequalities is assuming the perfect monitoring, where ￿ ! 1 which is mean
it is so easy to prove weather the ￿rm cheats or not. Another way, when the ￿rm
could not perfectly monitored, by setting up the incentive for being honest. Consider
￿ ￿
  !






￿￿ is an incentive to ￿rms for being
11honest. As we would expect, the size of rent will decrease with the increase of moni-
toring level and/or with the the level of probability of losing the reputation when he
get proved.





















follows Proposition 1. Suppose ￿ and ￿ are so small, then ￿M will be negative, which
is mean the adoption of CSR codes is not sustainable. On contrary, if ￿ and ￿ are so
high, then ￿M will tend to ￿￿ from the Proposition 1.
Cournot Competition.￿
Similarly to what we have seen in the Bertrand competition game, in the Cournot
competition game, I will presents the same model with some adjustments due to the
nature of Cournot competition game.
The most important adjustment in this part is ￿, which I de￿ne as pairing level
between private and public good. In the Bertrand competition game, ￿ is not explic-
itly exposes, since ￿rms compete in price. But when they compete in quantity, they
have to present it explicitly in order to attract responsible consumers.















Where this inverse demand function satisfying P 0
i f￿￿￿g < 0 and P 00
i f￿￿￿g ￿ 0 for
all (qi;￿i) ￿ 0 and P f0g > c for non responsible ￿rms and P f0g > c + ￿￿ for
responsible ones.







￿ (qj;￿j) ￿ CR (qj;￿j)
12Where CR (qj;￿j) = fc + ￿￿jg(qj;￿j) and (qj;￿j) =
￿
qj = ￿j￿j ; ￿j > 0
￿
4 5.
￿N = argmaxPN(qj + q￿j) ￿ qj ￿ CN (qj) where CN (qj) = cqj
Proposition 3. In Cournot competition, the markets prices are greater than in the

























































































































When the responsible ￿rms compete in Cournot competition game, it is not suf-
￿cient with only two ￿rms in order to have the competitive level of ￿￿ like in the
Bertrand competition game. Nevertheless, this type of game capture the motion of
the increasing in CSR activities along with the increasing of responsible ￿rms, which
could be a good signal for a new entrant for responsible good, since there are not so
many player for this type of good.
Examinations for Cournot Competition Game Here we also try to examine
several conditions which could be important to understand the economic value of
CSR.
4￿ can be considered as relative price of public good in terms of private good. In mathematical
point of view, the relationship between ￿ and ￿ is (￿ = 1
￿).
5In the next section, ￿ has importance role.
13Condition 5 Raising CSR standard
With Cournot competition game, we can distinguish raising standard, in terms of
quantity or quality. In terms of quantity, I de￿ne raising standard as an increasing





























￿ c, which is mean
that the increasing of qi will make responsible ￿rms worse-o⁄, thus it is better for
them to serve the non responsible consumers. Similar condition happens when the
raising standard of CSR comes from the increasing value of ￿i, recall the Proposition
2 for ￿￿ and in which P 0
R f￿￿￿g < 0 and P 00
R f￿￿￿g ￿ 0 thus when we increase the
value of ￿i, we will decrease the ￿￿. This happens since the cost will increase when
￿i increases, consequently, price will increase and demand will decrease. And at the
end the CSR activities will decrease.
Next, in terms of quality, raising standard is the increasing in quality of pub-
lic good provided ￿ to its highest quality b ￿. Like in the case of Bertrand com-


























































A + VR (￿i) + f (h￿) + f ((h ￿ 1)￿) = ￿b ￿.
It is worth to emphasize that an increase in quality has a meaning to put more
e⁄ort to provide a better quality of public good. For example, instead of using child
labor, ￿rms use adult labor. Then, if an increase of quality from ￿ to b ￿ has no e⁄ect
on cost, then obviously it will generates Pareto improvement. And o⁄course the raise
of CSR standard will not make any di⁄erent, since the number of responsible ￿rms
does not change. Futhermore, like in the Bertrand competition game, this highest
standard of CSR can not be implemented in the normal market because b ￿ < ￿.
14In addition, if the raise to the highest standard has impacts on cost, then Propo-
sition 3, especially for responsible consumers, will be like:
Proposition 3b. When the raise of standard increases the cost of responsible ￿rms

















































































The proof follows the Proposition 3. " is the additional cost for ￿rms to comply the
highest standard. And as we would expected, this standard will never implemented
in the case of Cournot competition game.
Condition 6 Entry cost
This condition try to examine the setup cost incurred by the ￿rms on entering such
an industry. We represent the ￿rms￿decision as taking place in two stage: at the ￿rst
stage, each of a number of potential entrants decide whether or not to enter. Then,
at the second stage, those ￿rms that have entered set their respective quantity. We
will see what will happen to the CSR activities when the setup cost needed.

















Rf(qJ;￿J)+(q￿J;￿￿J)g as J ! 1, so aggregate quantity approaches
to the competitive level. Solving for real number e J 2 R we will gives us an equi-
librium outcome in which the number of entrants to the market increases steadily
as the level of setup cost falls from monopoly pro￿ts, at which we have one en-
trant, to zero, where the number of entrants becomes arbitrarily large. Now con-
sider the ￿rms￿entry decisions at stage one. Given the entry decisions of its ri-












￿ ￿, then the level of
CSR activities will increase when entry is pro￿table.
Therefore, under Cournot competition game, the government can play an important
role by setting a policy that could enhance or attract a new entrant to come. In the
case for responsible ￿rms, the government not only solve the competitiveness but
also increasing the private provision of public good. In line with the question of
government credibility, here what government should do is only to make sure that
there is a competitiveness in the market and leave the rest to the market.
Condition 7 Monitoring
Here we use the same framework like in the monitoring condition for Bertrand
competition. Where ￿rm could weather being honest by providing the promised pair
of (qj;￿j) or cheat and deviate for what he promised and set
  !
￿ = ￿￿, where
  !
￿ is
the level of CSR activities which ￿rm carried out and ￿ is the cheating level of one
￿rm, with ￿ 2 f0;1g. And when ￿rm is caught cheating, he will lose his market for
responsible consumers forever, which is mean that either he makes nothing or change
to serve the non responsible consumers.
We also assume here that all ￿rms are risk neutral, and when he was cheating,
will get proved with probability ￿. When he is proved cheating, then he loses his
reputation with probability ￿. Firm￿ s payo⁄ when he does not cheat is: ￿ =
16(￿R + r), where ￿R is pro￿t for responsible ￿rm and r is the rents that ￿rm can
earn for his good social reputation. And ￿rm￿ s payo⁄ when he cheats, will be:
  !
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)(￿N + r) + ￿ (￿N + (1 ￿ ￿)r). In this condition, being honest is sus-
tainable when ￿ ￿
  !
￿ The simplest way to prove these inequalities is assuming the
perfect monitoring, where ￿ ! 1 which is mean it is so easy to prove weather the
￿rm cheats or not. Another way, when the ￿rm could not perfectly monitored, by
setting up the incentive for being honest. Consider ￿ ￿
  !
￿ ￿ 0, or ￿R + ￿￿r ￿ ￿N.
The last inequality shows that the pro￿t of cheating will be less than being honest
because ￿rm gets some positive incentive for his honesty ￿￿r. Unlike the monitoring
condition under Bertrand competition, in this case the size of rent is not decreasing
with ￿ and ￿, due to the natural of Cournot competition game, where ￿rms can make
a positive pro￿t.
Therefore, the incentive in Cournot competition game increase with the level of
monitoring, so ￿rms will not deviate from being honest since being honest has higher
pay-o⁄ than try to deviate from their o⁄ering at the ￿rst stage.
CSR AND GOVERNMENT
The main issues of CSR studies are feasibility of CSR, in terms of pro￿t and desir-
ability of CSR, in terms of the level public good provided. In the previous section,
I show that CSR is in line with pro￿t maximization and also it could be sustainable
under di⁄erent condition. Now we will move to more general situation, in which I
compare CSR activity with government regulation, especially to provide the public
good.
17CSR and Regulation
Suppose the government impose a uniform standard, that each ￿rm has to provide
some amount of public good ￿
s.
Proposition 4. If the government standard is relatively small, then the public good
provided will increase. But if it is relatively large, then the government standard
will ruled-out the non responsible consumers, and it will follow the result from the
situation of raising standard.
Proposition 4 relies on the presence of personal valuation Vi (￿i), because responsible
consumers care more about their personal bene￿t for each purchase that they made,
not on the impact of the total amount of public good. Thus when government impose
the standard, the level of public good provided will be ￿s = V 0
R (￿i) + hf0(I￿i)6.
Clearly responsible consumers are better o⁄ when impose the standard, but if the
standard is too high then the non responsible consumers will stop consuming the
private good x since the price of new private good is exceed its bene￿t, and as the
result, the amount of public good provided just like in the case of raising standard,
but this time come from exogenous force. Furthermore, if non responsible consumers
stop consuming the private good, then the non responsible ￿rms either switching their
market to responsible consumers or stop their production. Clearly when government
imposes standard, there will be Pareto improvement, but if the standard is too high,
the improvement that happen, comes from the losing of non responsible good.
Now we move on the case where government impose lump-sum tax to everybody to
￿nance public good. Most of public economics literatures shown that tax will crowd-
out perfectly the private provision of public good. Nevertheless this situation is no
longer true in the presence of personal valuation (Andreoni, 1991).
6This is also true for Cournot competition game, because now all ￿rms become responsible ￿rms.
h ! 1 thus P0
R f￿￿￿g and P00
R f￿￿￿g goes to zero
18Proposition 5. Uniform tax will not perfectly crowd-out the private contribution
from the purchase of responsible good, in the presence of personal valuation.
Focusing on the responsible consumers, so when the government impose a lump-
sum tax, then the contribution of each responsible consumer is not only come from
the individual purchase of responsible good ￿i, but also comes from the lump-sum
tax ti. Therefore the total public good provided from responsible consumers is GR =
h P
i=1











To understand that tax will not crowd-out perfectly the total contribution, I will
neglect personal valuation Vi (￿i) for a moment. For the case of perfect crowding
out, @f=@ti = @f=@￿i or
@f=@ti
@f=@￿i = 1 which is mean the reduction of consumer i￿ s
contribution from her purchase of responsible good will be equal to the increasing
of her contribution from the tax. Or in the other words, consumer i is willing to
substitute perfectly her contribution between tax and her purchase. Next for the
case of imperfect crowding-out, @f=@ti ￿ @f=@￿i or
@f=@ti
@f=@￿i ￿ 1 which is mean the
consumer i is not willing to perfectly substitute, by reducing ￿i the same amount
with the increasing of ti. These properties of ￿rst derivative from the bene￿t of
public good have exactly the same meaning with the properties in the paper of James
Andreoni (1991).
Bring back the personal valuation, and comparing the marginal bene￿t for each
type of contribution; purchase of responsible good ￿ and tax t. Marginal bene￿t for
the contribution that comes from the purchase is V 0
i (￿i)+f0 (G) and from the tax is





i (￿i)+f0(G) ￿ 1, so when government imposes the
tax, the reduction from the purchase of responsible good will less that the increase
of the tax. Furthermore,
f0(G)
V 0
i (￿i)+f0(G) = 1 if and only if there is no marginal bene￿t of
personal valuation V 0
i (￿i) = 0, or in other words this consumer is totally altruistic.
19It is worth to emphasize that the imperfect crowding-out of public good provision
is not because the government can carry-out their role really well, but simply because
of the presence of personal valuation. If we take out the personal valuation, then the
story will go like in the normal case of private provision of public good.
Basically, Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 show that there are two options for
government to address consumption externalities; by using command to in￿ uence the
behavior of ￿rms, or by using price to in￿ uence the behavior of consumers. Charles
L. Schultze (1977) ￿nds that government prefer to use command instead of price
to address consumption externalities, and he argues whether command could be an
e⁄ective policy instrument in order to generate social e¢ ciency and the government￿ s
ability to command an appropriate level of performance.
Government Imperfection
CSR becomes a new hot topic recently is because there is a less faith in government.
Theoretically, what government does, by implementing policy or regulation, is to
improve economic e¢ ciency by correcting the market failure. Francis M. Bator (1958)
de￿nes market failures as the failure of market system to prevent the undesirable
activities, where desirability is measured by explicit economic welfare maximization
problem.
There are two basis analysis that we could use to conclude whether government
policy or regulation success to overcome the market failure or not (Cli⁄ord Winston,
2006). First, does government have any reason to intervene the market? Or is there
evidence of a serious problem of market failure? Second, does government improve
the market performance, by reducing the deadweight loss? Government imperfection
arises when government creates ine¢ ciency because it intervenes market on the ￿rst
place or it fails to improve market performance and can not generate greater net
bene￿ts.
20The main source of government imperfection is political forces. George Stigler
(1966, 1982) argues that the main reason why government intervenes market is to
redistribute income, therefore it is almost impossible to have government policy that
only focuses on the creation of competitiveness in the market. Gene Grossman and
Elhanan Helpman (2005) argue, particularly in the case of free trade, that there is a
protectionist bias in politician.
One biggest problems that come from political forces is the trade-o⁄between solv-
ing market failure and social goals. In theory, solving market failure and achieving
social goals should complement each other. By improving market e¢ ciency and re-
ducing rent extraction that adversely redistribute income. And by redistributing
income on the e¢ ciency way, social goals will not a⁄ect negatively market e¢ ciency.
Nonetheless, in the reality, solving market failure could create a con￿ ict with social
goals.
Consider the situation, in which government wants to provide public good. If






, then neither raising standard
nor lump-sum tax could be a good idea, since none of them is a popular policy,







, then combining CSR with either raising standard or lump-sum tax
will lead to an excessive provision of public good, because non responsible consumers
are being forced to pay the standard or tax.
Proposition 6. If responsible consumers are not in a majority, then market failure
and social goals substitute each other. If responsible consumers are in a majority,
then market failure and social goals complement each other. But it will creates an
excessive provision of public good if it combines with CSR activity.
Another problem of government imperfection is the problem of voting paradox.
Consider the situation in which government o¢ cials corrupt the tax which is going to
use to ￿nance the provision of public good. As we know, monitoring level plays an im-
21portant role to avoid the deviation of ￿rms from their own commitment. Same in this
case, government transparency also plays an important role to avoid the corruption
of government o¢ cials.
If monitoring and transparency level is equal, which is mean the probability of get
proved, either cheat or corrupt is same, CSR in some cases still dominates government
in provision of public good, regardless is there any personal valuation or not. The
reason is related with voting paradox. If one ￿rm get proved cheat, the consumers
can punish it by not purchasing from its product. But in the case government get
proved corrupt, voters can not just do like in the case of ￿rm, do not vote for that
party in the next election.
In voting analysis, the main assumption is voters choose to cast their votes, but
some observations show that many countries frequently experience low voters turnouts
in election, since the participation in voting almost always involve the costs, thus if
individuals are rational, they will only choose to vote if they know the expected
bene￿ts of voting exceed the costs. Back to our case, if the corrupt government
o¢ cials come from majority party, then consumer i will not go to vote, because
her vote does not have any a⁄ect on the outcome. In other words, being pivotal is
really important to punish the corrupt government o¢ cial, but unfortunately being
important is really hard to ￿nd, especially in the case of multi party.
CONCLUSION
Recent phenomenon shows there is a signi￿cant grows in the number of ￿rms which
adopt Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) codes. Basically, from economic point
of view, this activity is not feasible especially if there is an intense competition, since
￿rms have to sacri￿ce its pro￿t. And thus CSR raises lot of objection, particularly
from Milton Friedman who argues that social matters do not belong to corporate ob-
jective. This idea is based on the dichotomy of role between private and government,
22and also the motivation of CSR. Nonetheless if this recent phenomenon is based on
the increase of demand for socially responsible good, then CSR activity is feasible
from the economic point of view because its motivation is to ful￿ll the demand and
not purely socially responsible, more precisely, it is a strategic CSR. Furthermore
CSR activity could be considered as a new way to internalize the externality in price,
or in other words it is similar to the idea of Pigovian tax, but now it is not government
who carry-out the task.
In addition, CSR activity is not only feasible, but also desirable from the economic
point of view, in terms of cost. Many studies show that government failure could be
more costly than market failure; therefore it would be better to minimize the gov-
ernment intervention in economy7. And CSR activity could be an alternative way
to deal with the government failure. This is in line with critic of Milton Friedman
(1962) about government role in all aspect in economy, Charles L. Schultze (1977)
is the one who raise doubts in systematic way about the e⁄ectiveness of government
policies based on the limited empirical evidence and Charles Wolf Jr. (1979) who
introduces the non market failure to indicate some type of government failure and
suggests that government failure is also important as market failure. Therefore, CSR
is feasible and desirable. Feasible means CSR can still get along with pro￿t maxi-
mization, under high competitive market (Bertrand competition) or less competitive
market (Cournot competition). Desirable means CSR dominates government role in
providing the some public good.
Nevertheless, the problem of CSR activity is not only the problem of feasibility and
desirability that will a⁄ect on the sustainability of CSR, but also the problem where
highest CSR standard cannot be implemented in the normal market. This problem
is related with the type of social activity that ￿rms do. In the most cases of CSR,
7The newest example of government failure is government prefer tradable emissions permits (cap-
and-trade schemes) than emission tax.
23￿rms do something that they think is the best for the society without considering the
possibility for they have done is not the best according to the society8. The lesson
here is the needed of third party (outside the producers and consumers) to examine
and to accept the ￿rms plan on CSR. A well carried-out CSR codes adoption, not only
can mitigate the future threat and earn positive pro￿t, but also well and convincingly
documented (Heal, 2005). This is reminiscent of the saying that it is not enough that
justice is done￿ it must also be seen to be done.
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APPENDIX
Proof for Proposition 1. Due to Bertrand competition game, all ￿rms set their
price equal to their cost is a Nash equilibrium. And therefore all ￿rms will have zero
pro￿t at equilibrium price. To understand what happen in the equilibrium, consider
the situation for the responsible ￿rms where the package (p1;￿1) > c+￿￿ then other
￿rms except ￿rm 1 can increase their pro￿t, either by setting their price equal to ￿rm
1￿ s price p￿1 = p1 but o⁄ering more commitment of public good ￿￿1 > ￿1. Or by
reducing their price below ￿rm 1￿ s price p￿1 < p1, but o⁄ering the same level of public
26good ￿￿1 = ￿1. Therefore, it will attract all responsible consumers of ￿rm 1, since
they realize that they will get a better payo⁄when they go to other ￿rms except ￿rm
1.Same argument for the non responsible ones.
Setting the price equal to the cost implies ￿rms will o⁄er the same amount of private
good x for the non responsible good, or the same pair of private-public good (pj;￿j)
for responsible good. And because the consumers who purchase the responsible good
are the responsible consumers only, thus the contribution of private good of non
responsible consumers through the purchase of responsible good is zero.
Now we only consider the responsible consumers and determine the e¢ cient level
of public good provided. Recall for the utility function for responsible consumers is









￿N. Since we know that non
responsible consumers will not contribute, then ￿N = 0. And thus the maximization
problem will be:







Solve this maximization with respect to ￿i will bring us to the Proposition 1.
Now we have to make sure that Proposition 1 can prevent from the the deviation
from each type of consumers.
Non responsible consumers
b ￿ c + f(h￿
￿) ￿ b ￿ c ￿ ￿￿
￿
i + f ((h + 1)￿
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By concavity of f(h￿)
















Now it is obvious for non responsible consumers if one of them deviates, she will
strictly worse-o⁄.
27Responsible consumers
b ￿ c ￿ ￿￿
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Thus Proposition 1 prevents from any deviation.
Proof for Proposition 2. Like in Proposition 1, price will equal to cost pR =
c + ￿￿R + "(￿R), and it brings us to the new level of public good provided ￿ =
V 0
R (￿i) + f0(h￿) ￿ "0 (￿i). To avoid the deviation for responsible consumers, the
following inequality should hold:
VR (￿i) + f(h￿) ￿ [(V
0
R (￿i) + f
0(h￿i))￿i + f((h ￿ 1)￿i)] + ["(￿i) + ￿i"
0 (￿i)]
Unfortunately this inequality is true if and only if the second part from the left hand
side goes to zero.
Proof for Proposition 3. Note that this proof depends on the assumption
that ￿rms have identical cost function, either for producing private good or pro-
viding public good, and similar in Bertrand competition, there is a unique price













. Where P￿1 f￿￿￿g = c +
















A, then ￿rm 1 will loss her demand,
since all responsible consumers will go to the ￿rms which can o⁄er the smaller price
or higher level of CSR activity.
Just like in any microeconomics textbook, proposition 2 tells us that the presence of
two ￿rms is not su¢ cient to obtain competitive outcome, like in Bertrand competition.
28This situation opens the room, in which government policies might be powerful to
enhance the participation of non responsible ￿rms in CSR activity. The proposition
two also prevents the deviation from each type of consumer.
Non responsible consumers
















































By concavity of f(h￿)
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Recall that this last inequality is true, since both side are negative, but the right hand
side has more negative value.
29Responsible consumers




















































































































Like in the case of non responsible consumers, the negative value on the left hand
side is bigger compare to the right hand side.
30